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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PDD-56-1: SYNCHRONIZING EFFECTS; BEYOND THE POL/MIL PLAN

BY

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PDD-56-1: Synchronizing Effects; Beyond the POL/MIL Plan

by

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE:

PDD-56-1: Synchronizing Effects; Beyond the POL/MIL Plan

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

10 April 2000

PAGES: 28

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper offers a summary of steps taken thus far and potential solutions that will provide for more effective management in execution of complex contingency operations. In the four years since PDD-56 was signed, we have produced an organization optimized for interagency planning. PDD-56 has generated profound results in our effort to build cooperation and integration of effort in our pol/mil planning process. Our ability as a nation, to plan for well-synchronized application of national power in response to complex contingencies is impressive. We need a national level Interagency CINC, charged with the execution of complex contingencies where unity of command can be brought to the interagency effort. The Department of Defense should not take the lead agency role, nor should any independent agency of our government, in our effort to synchronize all elements of national power. USSOCOM offers unique capabilities and a military culture, which is conducive to most effectively execute DOD tasks associated with complex contingencies. It is time to consider leveraging distinctive competencies of Special Operations Command as a controlling and supported headquarters for the military element power in planning and execution of these types of missions. We need a staff to support CINCIA that can streamline coordination of the interagency plan and drive an effective rehearsal of pol/mil plans-passing them to field agencies for execution. Finally, we must empower our regional commanders with an interagency capability for implementation of pol/mil plans that takes us beyond military leaders herding other agencies by the power of persuasion towards a common purpose.

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PDD-56-1: SYNCHRONIZING EFFECTS; BEYOND THE POL/MIL PLAN

Synchronizing effects of national power is the business of government and the object of national systems designed by leaders to achieve their vision. Complex contingency operations clearly call for innovative combinations and effective synchronization of all elements of national power.

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively. \(^1\)

The National Security Council was established in 1947 in order to control and integrate the levers of national power, currently known as the interagency. Yet, as the current debate over the effectiveness of Presidential Decision Directive 56 has highlighted, it is clear that interagency coordination problems still exist. On 20 May 1997, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," to improve political, military, humanitarian, economic, and other dimensions of planning for interventions identified as complex emergencies, e.g., a peacekeeping operation or foreign humanitarian assistance. PDD-56 recognizes our ad hoc method of integration and calls for unity of effort from all elements of national power.

While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.³

Dedicated and focused involvement from our senior statesman would resolve the most difficult issues, yet presidential oversight should not be required for any single aspect of running the government. President Clinton has called attention to a challenge of achieving unity of effort from a collection of agencies, independent by nature, with distinctive operating systems, styles, rules and cultures. A tremendous effort towards developing an effective process has resulted in an interagency mechanism capable of developing well-integrated political and military plans. This amounts to a critical first step, but we must not forget that achieving national policy goals requires good planning and execution. Perhaps the time has come to focus more on implementation rather than development of policy. The purpose of this study is to review the progress made thus far and to argue for a new focus beyond integrated planning, towards effective coordination and management of agency operations during execution. It is about our ability to synchronize effects, as well as plans—the art of getting things done at the national level.

BACKGROUND

The world is changing and so are our methods of applying elements of national power. Our system is a product of success, albeit inefficient at times, it has been successful. It is a system that until the end of the cold war was threat based and dominated by application of military power to achieve national security strategy. Methods developed during the twentieth century are ingrained and reflect the independent culture of the interagency. In the past, those agencies were successful with a focused and independent effort towards achieving policy aims. Diplomatic, economic and military solutions were seldom combined in any sort of synchronized campaign. The character of organizations we call the interagency today reflects their successes in the last century; independent, specialized and competitive. Further complicating the challenge is the evolving "American Way of War" in which the application of military power seems appropriate for almost anything. Engagement Strategy strikes at a cultural bias of the past that often isolated the military from other elements of national power – seen somehow as incompatible with other means. Military power is certainly no longer a blunt instrument of war or a means of last resort.

The military lever is only one among many that must work together to solve challenges associated with complex contingency operations. As the Cold War came to an end, it became clear that serious problems exist in planning for and responding to international crises. Each agency and department developed its plans independently, often without a common vision of central issues facing our nation. Uncoordinated planning produced serious differences in assumptions, concepts, policy recommendations and plans. This bottom-up review of all requirements generated from different and sometimes competitive perspectives was left to the NSC to combine to form national policy. Consequently, key leaders of the NSC and Deputies quickly became overwhelmed with decision requirements generated by multiple contingency scenarios. A clear consensus evolved that the US interagency community had to improve its process for establishing policy and reaching decisions about US participation in complex contingencies.⁵

Like any other bureaucracy, the interagency is extremely resistant to change. One significant obstacle yet to overcome is the perception that this directive was born of DOD maneuvering to gain an ever more dominate roll in our nation's affairs. Interagency competition for resources combined with a suspicion that DOD has promoted PDD-56 in order to gain more power has resulted in even greater reluctance on the part of non-uniformed agencies to fully support the intent of the directive. Despite such a climate, in the short time since PDD-56 was signed, we have produced an organization optimized for interagency planning. Our country has devoted tremendous organizational energy towards developing a mechanism that builds strategy, policy and effective plans from national vision. The goal was to ensure a balanced and well-synchronized analysis by civilian and military components of any intervention before any US assets were committed. The NSC has since developed a well-defined process that facilitates policy and strategy development. An outgrowth of this endeavor is a complex mosaic of working groups and committees operating within a very impressive matrix organization optimized for integrated agency

planning. It is a system that has been proven over time and by the test of several crises. Our most recent interventions have focused attention and pressure on the US interagency process, with a view toward doing everything possible to get policy and management plans approved and coordinated before sending in the troops. Unfortunately, once we commit troops, our CINCS have remained charged for unity of interagency effort without authority to exercise unity of command, a problem that calls for an architecture that supports execution phase of operations. Our nation's ability to coordinate effective policy does not naturally lead us to effective execution in the field.

KEY ELEMENTS OF PDD-56

It is useful to explain first what the provisions of PDD-56 are not designed to achieve. The directive is not intended to provide policy oversight for responses to domestic disasters, terrorism, noncombatant evacuations, or, at the other end of the conflict spectrum, international armed hostilities and major theaters of war. This directive is not designed to determine whether the United States should deploy US Government personnel, military or civilian, in response to a crisis. The Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25) is designed to help policymakers reach sound conclusions about conflict prevention and resolution, and to help shape decisions about committing the United States to intervene in crises. PDD-56 was created to guide integration of diplomatic, military, humanitarian, and other responses to complex emergencies, but only after a decision to intervene has been made.⁶

INTENT

The intent of PDD-56 is to define a specific planning process for managing complex emergencies. The ultimate goal is clearly to achieve unity of effort among the levers of national power residing in federal agencies and departments. The objective is efficient and focused responses to emergencies; reducing risk of overextending capabilities or inappropriate use of limited resources. PDD-56 defines a process that can facilitate integration and coordination of civilian and military efforts in response to complex emergencies.⁷

Operations that fall within the purview of PDD-56 span a diverse and wide range of requirements. From peace accord implementation, such as the operation presently under way in Bosnia, through humanitarian intervention similar to Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1992-93, to humanitarian relief such as Operation Support Hope in Rwanda in 1994, each contingency is different and calls for integration of expertise from throughout the interagency team. Interagency personnel that assemble to take responsibility for recommending and implementing policy in these kinds of contingencies are task organized to address characteristics of the crisis at hand. Partners, not traditionally involved in crisis management, join staffs that routinely work together— (the NSC, the State Department, and the Department of Defense)—including, but not limited to: the Office of Management and Budget; the Department of Justice; the Treasury Department; the US Agency for International Development; and possibly a representative from the US Mission to the United Nations. Add to this new policy team, input from field offices of the US Government, regional bodies, the United Nations, and

nongovernmental organizations; and it soon becomes apparent why unity of purpose, planning and effort in the interagency process can be so difficult.⁸

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

PDD-56 also provides for an Executive Committee (EXCOM) to supervise the production of strategic plans. The EXCOM is established by Department Deputy Secretaries through their Deputies Committee and provides day-to-day management of US participation in crisis. The EXCOM is responsible for policy development, planning, oversight, and implementation. It is composed of Department Assistant Secretaries who constitute a standing crisis action group that includes all appropriate federal departments and agencies, including those normally outside interagency working group structure. The EXCOM is also directed by PDD-56 to ensure lessons learned from previous missions are regularly and routinely made available to the entire interagency team.

EXCOM's responsibilities include determination of valid tasks and responsibilities; crisis action response; synchronization of timelines; and resource allocation (personnel and funding). Perhaps the most important node in the emerging structure for managing complex emergencies, the EXCOM keeps pace with crisis events, anticipates problems, assigns tasks, and monitors planning and operations in all agencies involved. It brings unsolved problems and issues to the attention of the Deputies Committee for decisions, and is responsible for conducting interagency after-action reviews of all USG interventions in support of complex contingency operations.⁹

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The directive integrates civilian and military contributions to the policy development process with the political-military implementation plan. Commonly referred to as the "pol/mil plan," it is a vitally important product for developing policy and associated operations plans. The intent of the pol/mil plan is to provide unifying direction for a comprehensive assessment, which helps to forge consensus and efficient use of resources among all participants. A common vision of purpose, ends, ways and means are essential to achieve unity of effort. It also serves to streamline coordinating architecture and to identify participants' responsibilities and priorities. The plan includes a strategic assessment, organization, mission, objectives, end-state, and concept of operations. It identifies initial tasks and provides guidance for independent agency planning to meet mission specific tasks. The pol/mil plan establishes agency accountability and ensures all participants understand each agency's contribution to the planning process. 11

REHEARSALS

The requirement for rehearsals is a critical feature of PDD-56. Prior to committing resources, the interagency team must rehearse the pol/mil plan. Rehearsals refine integration of agency plans that must achieve unity of effort. Directed by the Deputies Committee, rehearsals review the agency mission area

plans, establishes basis for synchronizing all US Government operational activities in the crisis area, resolves competing priorities, highlights agency accountability and deconflicts critical resource issues. Rehearsals are a proven tool for achieving unity of effort and sharing the vision among leaders and those charged with execution, they synchronize systems and link plans to real world challenges.¹²

AFTER ACTION REVIEWS

Another unique aspect of PDD-56 is its requirement for an interagency after-action review at the conclusion of US participation in complex contingency operations. In compliance with provisions of PDD-56, the EXCOM initiates an after-action review involving field agencies and those who monitored its conduct from outside the theater of operations. The assessment includes a review of interagency planning and coordination, both in Washington and in the field, legal and budgetary difficulties encountered, and proposed solutions to problems. Every effort is made to capture relevant lessons from operations to improve future performance. PDD-56 specifically charges the EXCOM to distribute lessons learned throughout the interagency community (not just to those that participated in the operation) and to integrate lessons into future plans and operations. This EXCOM responsibility, together with the requirement for annual interagency training sets PDD-56 apart from other presidential directives. For the planning process to respond to lessons derived from actual operations, the after-action review is an essential first step towards implementing a system for change.

TRAINING

Training is key to success and especially for long-term solutions to how our government operates. The training program mandated by PDD-56 and led the National Defense University, is intended to familiarize key members of the US Government's interagency community with the most current planning tools and procedures in the political-military planning process and lessons learned from complex contingency operations. ¹⁴ It also has an objective of providing interagency cultural awareness that will lead to better cooperation and more efficient use of resources.

PDD-56 requires the National Security Council to develop and conduct an interagency training program for managing complex emergencies. Departments of State and Defense support this program-conducted yearly in conjunction with appropriate US federal educational institutions, including the National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, and the Army War College (US Army Peacekeeping Institute). The training familiarizes federal officials with processes and procedures for developing and implementing pol-mil plans to deal with complex emergencies. Those participating in training have an opportunity to interact with key leaders and practitioners from all agencies and experienced members of field organizations. Such opportunities also serve to develop habitual planning relationships, establishing liaisons and standard practices that lead to more efficient future operations – a critical step towards overcoming significant challenges anchored by different cultures and operating systems within the interagency. Effective training will accomplish two key goals of PDD-56: (1) establish long term improvements to interagency cooperation by growing future leaders who understand how to

integrate capabilities of all members of the interagency team and, (2) establish the pol/mil planning process within the interagency community as the way to respond to complex emergencies

IMPACT OF PDD-56

Implementation of this directive has made far-reaching improvements to our nations ability to




FIGURE 1 PRE PDD-56 PROCESS

respond to complex contingency operations. Prior to implementation of PDD-56, it was the responsibility of agencies to raise issues independently that may warrant attention of Deputies or Principals. Those issues would be discussed at Interagency Working Groups, often regionally chaired and lacking expertise of other agencies. When Deputies called for action, lead agencies would address planning and issues

would be resolved at the highest levels, raising an enormous burden directly to the Deputy Level of responsibility. Multiple contingencies resulted in saturation of decision requirements, which eventually overwhelmed Deputies. The USG plan became a collection of independent agency plans characterized by a distinct lack of integrated coordination.

COORDINATED INTERAGENCY EFFORT

With PDD-56, the interagency has slowly moved towards streamlining its planning efforts. This directive has set into motion an evolution of discipline, structure and predictability in the way we transform our engagement strategy into workable policy objectives and pol/mil plans. Certainly there is much work remaining, the goals have not been met, but the course has been clearly set. Albeit narrowly focused on our response to complex contingencies, we now leverage a well-coordinated interagency effort towards achieving more effective synchronization of all elements of national power. When a complex contingency appears, Deputies can now appoint an Executives Committee to focus and integrate a planning effort towards a single interagency pol/mil plan. Although some have criticized this new process for producing plans that are too detailed for national level products, the synergistic effects of such a coordinated interagency effort have had a very positive impact on the quality of USG engagement policy. It sets conditions for a shared vision within the interagency and a smooth transition to decentralized execution. Perhaps the most significant contribution of this directive is the emphasis on after action reviews and the integration of lessons learned. Integrating such a feedback mechanism establishes PDD-56 as an

instrument of change within the interagency, providing a process for perpetual reassessment, evolution and refinement.

In addition to key aspects of the PDD-56 highlighted in the previous section, this directive has also




FIGURE 2 POST PDD-56 PROCESS

led us towards three major initiatives — the addition of Annex V to all war plans and two new organizations designed by the NSC (CPIWG and MAST) to focus interagency efforts towards appropriate crisis response and more detailed pol/mil planning to assist civil-military leaders in complex contingency operations.

Interagency Participation in DOD Plans Deliberate Plans Crisis Action Crisis Action Approval Approval Review/Rec Approval Review/Rec NSC-Directed Action

FIGURE 3 ANNEX V INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

ANNEX V INTERAGENCY

COORDINATION

Annex V is a Joint Staff and OSD effort, which is designed to ensure CINC deliberate plans are properly integrated with other instruments of national power. It is a recent addition to the JSCP Deliberate Planning Process directed by the CJCS in October 1998. Using SOUTHCOM as a first case, the CJCS has called for an interagency annex which will integrate CINC plans with other instruments of national power in support of NCA objectives - a method of articulating what "the

CINC needs if a plan is executed." It identifies, by phase and category (Diplomatic, Economic, Humanitarian, etc.), major missions and tasks for interagency coordination. Annex V links interagency

issues to phases of military operations and sets in motion a review process that could lead to development of a full interagency pol/mil plan – a NSC directed product that could be used when needed in response to complex contingencies.¹⁷ Annex V is a by-product of PDD-56 that will likely evolve into a very useful tool for our geographic CINCs as they continue to face similar challenges when disengaging from larger scale contingency operations.

The deliberate planning tasks associated with development, review and DoD recommendation for further developments of the Interagency Coordination Annex are significant. Currently, there are 4 OPLANS, 5 CONPLANS w/TPFDD, 35 CONPLANS, 15 Functional Plans and 8 Theater Engagement Plans (67 total) targeted for this process. CINC approved plans are forwarded for review by DoD and the interagency for a NSC decision for development of a complete interagency pol/mil plan. The objective of this process is to provide a NSC led process to ensure CINC deliberate plans are properly integrated with other instruments of national power.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP (CP-IWG)

The NSC formed the CP-IWG to capture ever-expanding planning requirements in support of contingency operations. It is a product of PDD-56 and our experiences in pol/mil planning. Members




FIGURE 4 THE CP-IWG

include: NSC (chair); Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Justice, Transportation, Commerce, Agriculture and Energy: Office of Management and Budget; Central Intelligence Agency; Agency for International Development and the US Mission of the United Nations. The CP-IWG charter is to address three major Issues: First to monitor short range hot spots that may develop into complex contingencies and make recommendations to the Deputies Committee for any further pol/mil planning requirements.

Deputies may then direct full pol/mil plans and appoint an Executive Committee to oversee the interagency effort. Second - address the CINC's planning efforts in selective Annex V's and follow-on requirements for further pol/mil planning. Third - provide oversight and direction on interagency training and education requirements.¹⁹

MULTI-AGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (MAST)

The MAST is a concept that has not been tested and is currently being shaped by the CP-IWG. Although not addressed in PDD-56, MAST represents an initial attempt to connect the interagency centered in Washington D.C. to field agencies, where plans are executed under real world conditions.




FIGURE 5 MULTI-AGENCY SUPPORT TEAM

Still in the conceptual phase, it is designed to be task organized for specific missions and deployed to support International Organizations, CINC/JTF's and Country Teams wherever a contingency operation requires focused interagency effort. It is comprised of appropriate agency experts, established and deployed by the EXCOM to work in concert with field agencies to support execution of pol/mil plans. Support could come in the form of planning, coordination and in some cases

direct supporting action. The lead field agency would appoint a team leader, which could be from Defense, State, AID or another agency depending on the crisis.²⁰

WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP?

We need a solution that takes the most powerful nation in the world away from ad hoc coordination of complex contingencies to a more disciplined and synchronized implementation of policy guidance. The answer lies in a balanced approach towards refining planning mechanisms outlined above and a focused effort to link plans to effective execution architecture at national and regional levels. The problem may be that our leaders have become so vested in improving our ability to integrate plans, that we have underplayed the importance of a mechanism for execution. President Clinton recently expressed both his pleasure in the progress made thus far and his intent to continue the effort to establish systems that will enhance our nation's ability to synchronize all elements of power:

"...commend you for integrating other instruments of national power into DOD deliberate planning process. Considering political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, information, and other non-military activities in defense planning is an important initiative that will strengthen our ability to quickly and effectively respond to crises. Please forward to the NSC those political-military concepts for contingency and war plans you deem necessary for interagency review and appropriate action. I have asked Sandy Berger to ensure priority attention for them and to determine whether and to what extent these concepts

merit further development as political-military *plans*." (emphasis added) Bill Clinton, 3 November 1999.²¹

Our senior statesman's emphasis on planning highlight what I believe to be the next challenge — we must shift focus towards developing systems that will effectively *transform* pol/mil *plans into* well-synchronized *action*. No doubt that our military's distinctive competency for planning has made its mark. We are also a pragmatic and action oriented service, capable of reacting to the unpredictable nature of conflict, executing missions in a well-disciplined and effective manner. Engagement Strategy requires an interagency approach to achieve our national objectives. It is a complex, volatile and potentially more dangerous environment where we will face many smaller scale contingencies, military operations other than war, humanitarian assistance, and civil support — Weapons of Mass Destruction consequence management...conditions that will dominate near term national objectives.²² In this environment the interagency approach is an imperative where the Joint Force serves as both supporting and supported element in an overall USG response.

We have been successful, in good part by our ability to balance requirements, to plan future military operations while simultaneously executing current battles. If we are to continue that success in the operational environment of complex contingencies, we need to bring more discipline to the execution phase of interagency operations. In the final analysis, we are not judged by how well we plan, plans are judged by how well they are executed.

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS GROUP

Fundamental goodness exists in separating the tasks of plans and operations. Future operations should be planned with an understanding of the current situation, but done in an environment that is free from the confusion and friction associated with ongoing operations. Planners must remain focused on the ultimate objective, strategic ends and policy aims. In typical military staffs, another group, the operations staff, facilitates completion of the preparation phase by finalizing coordination and assisting the commander in sharing his vision with subordinate units via an effective rehearsal. One problem with excellent plans is that authors can become so vested in making their plan work that they fail to adapt to unexpected challenges during execution. It is an imperative of good operations to fight the enemy and not the plan. Friction and fog of war, as described by Clausewitz, applies to complex contingency operations just as it does to principles of war. Once a plan has been explored, all opportunities examined, the best course of action selected, it is time to pass it to the operations group for execution. In the military, this is commonly done at the time of rehearsal. The staff charged with current operations takes the order from the plans staff, fits it to the current situation with operational graphics and executes a rehearsal just prior to implementation. As the operations group supervises execution, the plans group transitions to continue their focus on future missions. This is a model that could assist in execution of pol/mil plans, just as it has for purely military operations.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS (CINCIA)

A requirement for an organization, such as the current operations group, responsible for execution of pol/mil plans approved by the Deputies Committee, the Primaries and the NCA is clearly evident. The chief of this organization should be appointed as CINC Interagency for Complex Contingency Operations (CINCIA) by the President of the United States and given specified authority for the accomplishment of complex contingency missions. While a military model, such as a specified command, could work, for DOD to lead this organization would be exactly wrong. What we need is a political appointee, provided with authority and resources to achieve a professional, integrated team approach. His authority would encompass tasking authority over all government agencies designated in support of the mission. His organization (National Interagency Emergency Operations Center) could be chartered as a new specified civilian organization with global responsibility for the specified purpose of executing USG response to emergency contingencies requiring an interagency effort. Candidates for this position may include the Vice President, a newly designated "Interagency CINC" as a specified commander in charge of complex contingencies, or it could possibly become a floating position among Chiefs of Station or Regional CINCs under specified orders from the President. I contend that the Vice President and Geographic CINCs are already too busy to provide the focus required, especially in the case of multiple contingency situations. The NSC, while equipped with the expertise to develop policy and strategy, are not well suited to supervise the details of execution. The best solution is an appointee, subordinate only to the President and possibly reporting to the NSC for day-to-day activities.

The fundamental purpose of this organization would be to enable a synchronized implementation of interagency efforts during execution of complex contingencies. It would routinely operate as a supporting headquarters and become a supported CINC only on the expressed authority of the President. It is




FIGURE 6 CINC INTERAGENCY FOR COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES

absolutely critical that this
headquarters focus on
specified tasks and not be
allowed to affect the current
chain of command in matters
outside of specified authority.
It should become a national
asset with a standing
professional staff represented
by all members of the
interagency community. As the
executive agent responsible for
planning and execution of
complex contingencies,
CINCIA would provide

invaluable leverage for the CPIWG and the EXCOM in fulfilling their responsibility for training, rehearsals and after action reviews required in support of complex contingencies. CINCIA should exercise control of a headquarters centered inside our borders but capable of rapid deployment of crisis action teams and providing on site regional assistance as required. Perhaps the MAST could become a standing Joint Interagency Task Force, subordinate to the CINCIA for such operations.

DOD COMPONENT TO CINCIA (USSOCOM)

The military component of this organization should be from an element able to provide operational expertise to small-scale contingencies and operations other than war. It must provide the wherewithal of planning and execution currently expected as we continue to prosecute multiple scenarios around the globe. Our geographic CINCs currently wrestle with this dilemma of maintaining capability for full-scale war despite complete immersion in complex contingencies. Such operations levy a large cumulative cost and significant commitment over time.

When charged with command and control of these operations, the Department of Defense has routinely relied upon regional commands to provide the wherewithal required for execution. We take this command which is organized, trained and equipped to fight and win our nations wars and we task them to re-tool their blunt instruments of war to meet very different challenges of a complex contingency. It highlights a larger issue that deals with our strategic culture and how Americans go to war. The military piece of that culture is embodied in our regional commands, focused on complete and decisive victory by achieving military conquest or unconditional surrender. The complexity of synchronizing combat power to achieve such ends in a high intensity conflict consumes every ounce of organizational energy for those in the military charged with that responsibility. From such an environment, our geographic CINCs evolve and thrive. From such an environment, also evolves a warfighting perspective that measures success in terms of application of the very same blunt instruments of war that will likely be exactly wrong for use in complex contingencies. This perspective is ingrained, it is not something that can be turned on and off with complete success. Yet that is exactly what we ask our CINCs to accomplish each time we challenge them with operations other than war.

Finding the best combination of ends, ways and means will continue to challenge our leaders in dealing with operations other than war; it is an assigned mission that our military will continue to accomplish. In the case of complex contingencies, I contend that the AOR oriented, warfighting perspective of our geographic commands may not provide the best military tools available to our Secretary of Defense. Special Operations Command could bring just the right perspective required for the Department of Defense component of an interagency effort to blend all elements of national power. CINCSOC commands an organization trained, equipped and organized primarily as a supporting headquarters with a strategic culture that is very adaptive in nature. SOCOM leverages a distinctly different military frame of reference grounded by close operations with peoples of all cultures. This command grows and nurtures our nation's expertise in civil-military affairs and military operations other

than war so critical to the military role in complex contingencies. USSOCOM seems the natural fit for command and control of the military in complex contingencies as a subordinate commander to CINCIA.

Standing up a CINCIA is not a near term solution, perhaps in the interim period or in the absence of a CINCIA, CJCS should consider assigning CINCSOC as the supported commander in response to complex contingencies such as currently ongoing in Bosnia. This may be counter intuitive to the military culture as we know it today, but is one way within DOD to allow our geographic commanders to refocus on warfighting.

VIRTUAL INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS STAFF

It is possible, through integrated and collaborative networks, to establish virtual staffs to support the interagency operations group. This organization should be assigned directly to CINCIA with positions filled under his allocation and physically occupied within the different agencies of the USG. A matrix staff connected by secure web networks and imbedded in all agencies supporting CINCIA will serve to facilitate unity of effort in a deliberate and crisis action planning role. The power of such an arrangement magnifies unique capabilities and cultures of separate agencies by routinely bringing their efforts together under the CINC responsible for interagency synchronization. Such a staff could facilitate collaborative planning in support of Annex V development for regional CINCs and eventual evolution towards full up pol/mil plans. This staff could also work within agencies to facilitate interagency coordination and rehearsal development. Resident expertise in particular pol/mil plans found in this staff would be critical in forming an effective MAST and providing for a smooth battle hand-over to the regional interagency operations group for ultimate execution. Routine working relationships and liaisons, established during deliberate and collaborative planning, will improve annual training between national and regional staffs. Knowing the key players, their agency culture and procedures will serve to build the trust and respect that lie at the foundation of effective crisis management. Such activities will also lead to common operational vision of evolving emergencies, anticipation of support requirements and ultimately serve to achieve the original goal of PDD-56, unity of effort.

REGIONAL INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS GROUPS (RIOC)

Any architecture designed to facilitate execution of national policy is incomplete until represented at the point of execution. Even if we habitually assign USSOCOM with responsibility for command and control of the military element charged with executing complex contingencies, regional CINCs will always retain detailed focus of effort in their areas of responsibility. CINCs will continue to require interagency support for a complete spectrum of requirements outside of the definition of complex contingencies. Some complex contingencies may best be resolved internal to the theater for a host of reasons, in such a case, and in many other examples, CINCs require better interagency connectivity on their staffs. Every regional combatant commander should be allocated an interagency operations group designed specifically for managing complex contingency operations in his area of responsibility. This is not a new proposal; it is a basic requirement that has been repeatedly identified each time we move to execute

another mission requiring integration of our interagency assets. After action comments and lessons learned abound, our nation continues to approach synchronization of all elements of national power in a very ad hoc manner. In some cases, such as Haiti and to some extent Bosnia, a concerted effort towards cooperation has prevailed, but never in a predictable, well organized way. The military answer is to form Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC), which has become the hub for coordination. Again, the CINC takes charge, when perhaps DOD should not be the lead agency in the execution of some of these complex contingencies. Our military supervises the execution of national policy, because there is no other structure available with the capability to actually get things done in the field. Agencies tend to fade away as other issues develop around the world, leaving the CINC struggling to accomplish tasks not well suited for military forces and seeking unity of effort from the interagency without unity of command. I contend that a more robust representation of all USG Agencies is required for regional CINC staffs to become effective at achieving unity of effort in complex contingency operations.

A RIOC assigned to Ambassadors, Chiefs of Station or our Regional CINCs, empowered by the authority of the senior USG representative in that area (Ambassador or CINC as assigned) could shoulder the responsibility of synchronizing effects of the interagency effort. This could be the structure that represents USG interests in the execution of a pol/mil plan and supports CINCIA as the regional CINCs representative in the execution of full up complex contingency operations.

CONCLUSION

Interagency cooperation will continue to be at the foundation of any successful peacetime engagement strategy. The problem is how to really achieve unity of effort in the absence of a body charged with synchronizing effects from such diverse organizations. Only the President and possibly the NSC have control over agencies best suited and most capable of obtaining stated national policy objectives associated with complex contingencies and neither is capable of detailed supervision. Our solution to this point has been to saddle regional CINCs with responsibility for achieving those ends regardless. My contention is that greater effect will be achieved by establishing a single chief of interagency operations focused on the specified missions associated with complex contingencies. Such an organization would be just as appropriate in any circumstances where the integration of all elements of US national power must be applied in a synchronized way, and no single agency is appropriate to be assigned lead authority. It could also be activated to support CINCs in major theaters of war as we reach war termination phase of operations. This concept deserves further study, but seems to make a sound argument for an effective mechanism to aid in our nation's transition to peace as our military prepares for the next war.

PDD-56 has generated profound results in our effort to build cooperation and integration of effort in our pol/mil planning process. Our ability, as a nation, to plan for a well-synchronized application of all elements of national power in response to the many complex contingencies that surely will come is impressive. A greatly respected congressman from Missouri once said, "The proof is in the pudding." This paper has captured in review the massive effort our nation has dedicated to improving our ability to

integrate a pol/mil plan; but more importantly, it has demonstrated a clear need to move beyond the plan and to organize for effective synchronization of effects during execution. Our energy must be focused on building effective organizations that can complete the preparation phase and rapidly transition to execution. We need a national level Interagency CINC, charged with the execution of complex contingencies where unity of command can be brought to the interagency effort. The Department of Defense should not take a lead role, nor should any independent agency of our government, in our effort to synchronize all elements of national power. USSOCOM offers unique capabilities and a military culture, which is conducive to most effectively execute DOD tasks associated with complex contingencies. It is time to consider leveraging the distinctive competencies of the Special Operations Command as a controlling and supported headquarters for the military element power in planning and execution of these types of missions.

We need a staff to support CINCIA that can streamline coordination of the interagency plan and drive an effective rehearsal of pol/mil plans—passing them to field agencies for execution. And finally, we must empower our regional commanders with an interagency capability for implementation of pol/mil plans that takes us beyond military leaders herding other agencies by the power of persuasion towards a common purpose. It is time to get beyond the plan and our ad hoc method of organizing to execute complex contingencies. Synchronizing the plan is only the beginning; we must create architecture and process that brings focus to synchronizing effects.

Word Count 6,361

ENDNOTES

- ¹ U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations</u>, Joint Publication 3.08 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, October, 1996) v
- ² Rowen Scarborough, "Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Mission." <u>The Washington Times</u>, 6 December 1999, sec. A, p. A1.
- ³ President William J. Clinton, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations Presidential Decision Directive 56," White Paper, Washington, D.C., 30 June 1997.
- ⁴ Jennifer Morrison Taw, Marcy Agmon and Lois M. Davis, <u>Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War Implications for the U.S. Army.</u> Washington D.C.: Rand, 1997: 18-27.
- ⁵ Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," <u>Parameters</u> XXVIII, NO.4, (Winter 1998-99):39. This journal article provides the best summary of the background leading to implementation of PDD-56 and it's key elements. A brief summary of their work is reflected in the first sections of this paper. A study of the Walsh article is highly recommended for those not familiar with the history and early development of PDD-56. It predates more recent developments such as Annex V, the MAST and the CPIWG, but provides an excellent review of the original intent and key components of the directive.

⁶ Ibid., 42-43.

⁷ William J. Clinton, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56." White Paper. Washington, D.C., 30 June 1997

⁸ Walsh, 43.

⁹ Ibid., 43-45.

¹⁰ Clinton, Annex A,1.

¹¹ Walsh, 44.

¹² Ibid., 44.

¹³ Ibid., 45.

¹⁴ National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, <u>Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56</u>. (NDU Study) 31 March 1999: 3.

¹⁵ Walsh, 45.

¹⁶ Ibid., NDU Study:17.

¹⁷ Wayne Radloff, Pentagon Joint Staff Officer. "Annex V – Enhancing Interagency Planning." J-7 Information Paper. Washington D.C. 19 November 1999.

- ¹⁸ Dr. Christopher Lamb, Director, Requirements and Plans (OSD), Briefing, "Interagency Participation in DOD Deliberate Plans," 6 January 2000.
- ¹⁹ Wayne Radloff, Pentagon Joint Staff Officer, J7/CWPD, Briefing, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," 29 November 00.
- ²⁰ Bill Corsetti, Joint Staff Officer, "Interagency Operations." J7 Information Paper. Washington, D.C. October 1999, 3.
- ²¹ William J. Clinton, "Note to Holders of the 1997 Contingency Planning Guidance." Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C., 3 November 1999.
- ²² William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u>. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999, 18-21.
- ²³ Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore. "Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore," Parameters 28 (Winter 1998-99): 99-112.

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